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As the battle against the Islamic State unfolds on the battleground and in 
cyberspace, the U.S. government has declared its commitment to disrupt—and 
ultimately defeat—the terrorist group. The Islamic State, also known as the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and ISIS, has become one of the most 
deadly and influential terrorist groups in the Middle East. Strategic 
communications cannot be underestimated.  
The unit tasked with countering the terrorist group’s propaganda and 
recruitment efforts, the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC), has recently restructured to improve its efforts. This 
thesis examines the Center’s mission, strategy, and communications to assess 
the efficacy of its efforts to counter the Islamic State terrorist group and degrade 
its ability to recruit foreign fighters. It analyzes the Islamic State and introduces 
the CSCC’s successor, the Global Engagement Center. Finally, it offers research 
findings and provides recommendations for future consideration.    
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The U.S. government has declared its commitment to disrupt and 
ultimately defeat the terrorist group the Islamic State (also referred to as IS, ISIL, 
ISIS, or Daesh) and the threat it poses to Iraq and the wider international 
community. As part of this objective, the United States is conducting 
counterterrorism operations using both kinetic and non-kinetic instruments of 
national power. One of the key non-kinetic efforts was led by the State 
Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) 
through its use of counter messaging, which is intended to reduce support for 
ISIL and other radical groups. However, while the United States has made 
substantial gains by conducting targeted airstrikes since the beginning of 
Operation Inherent Resolve, the Islamic State has been able to recruit an 
unprecedented number of foreign fighters. This thesis will examine the following 
question: What is the efficacy of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications’ efforts to disrupt the Islamic State’s ability to recruit foreign 
fighters? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
America’s enemies have noted the importance of strategic 
communications. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has stated that “more than 
half of the battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media 
battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims.”1 The United States does 
not appear to realize the importance of that battle. It often emphasizes more 
traditional kinetic means on the battlefield, as evident in former President Barack 
Obama’s statement during an address to the United Nations: “The only language 
                                            




understood by killers like this is the language of force.”2 He was referring to the 
jihadist group The Islamic State, and shortly afterward, the president announced 
that the United States would target the terrorist group by coordinating an air 
campaign, which is now known as Operation Inherent Resolve.3 However, 
experts argue that a campaign centered on the use of force is not likely to defeat 
ISIL or its powerful ideology. The need for an information campaign to counter 
the group’s narrative is imperative.  
The State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC) was established on September 9, 2011, by Executive 
Order 13584.4 The center launched its media campaign—Think Again, Turn 
Away— in December 2013.5 The CSCC was realigned in 2016 and renamed the 
Global Engagement Center. The change suggested the State Department 
recognized the CSCC’s lack of effectiveness;6 however, without an 
understanding of the limitations of the CSCC, it seems unlikely that a new 
organization will be more effective. Additionally, there are many scholars who 
claim that the State Department may not be the right entity to conduct such a 
campaign, because its methods are questionable and it effectiveness unclear.7 
This is an important issue if the United States is to align its policies with its 
strategy efficiently. 
                                            
2 David S. Sorenson, “Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the appeal of ISIS,” 
Parameters 44, no 3, (Autumn 2014): 27, 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Autumn_2014/USAWC_Quarterly
_Parameters_Autumn_v44n3.pdf.  
3Kathleen Bouzis, “Countering the Islamic State: U.S. Counterterrorism Measures,” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism (2015) 1–2, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1046302. 
4Executive Order No. 13584, 3 C.F.R. 586 (2011-206). 
5Rita Katz, “Think Again Turn Away: The State Department is Fumbling Online,” Time, 
September 16, 2014, http://time.com/3387065/isis-twitter-war-state-department/. 
6U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, “A New Center for Global 
Engagement,” Department of the State, accessed January 20, 2016. https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/01/251066.htm.  
7Tom McCauley, “The War of Ideas on the Internet: An Asymmetric Conflict in Which the 
Strong Become Weak,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and 
Genocide, 8, no.1 (March 2015): 81, doi: 10.1080/17467586.2014.1002511. 
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Although assessing the efficacy of the State Department’s methods to 
counter the Islamic State’s ability to recruit foreign fighters is relevant, these 
efforts are seemingly falling short, considering that the group’s recruiting 
numbers indicate that it had enrolled over 6,000 new members in June 2014.8 
According to some experts, the United States’ effort to disrupt and defeat the 
Islamic State may not only be ineffective, but in fact, it may be counter-
productive, as the State Department’s efforts may actually be aiding ISIS’ 
recruitment efforts.9 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to review the literature on the policies and 
strategies of the State Department’s CSCC, and in particular, the methods the 
United States uses to counter the Islamic State’s ability to recruit foreign fighters. 
The literature review begins with a review of the Islamic State’s use of 
propaganda and the State Department’s counter messaging strategy, followed by 
a review of the scholarly discourse on how to challenge the narrative of the 
Islamic State. This thesis will explore these works and others to assess the 
efficacy of the State Department’s CSCC and identify potential alternative 
strategies that the State Department’s restructured Global Engagement Center 
could adopt to increase its efficiency. 
1. Islamic State Propaganda 
Scholars suggest the Islamic State’s unprecedented rise has contributed 
to a return of mainstream attentiveness to jihadist propaganda.10 According to 
                                            
8 Christopher J. Bolan, “On Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the Appeal of 
ISIS” Parameters, (Winter 2014–2015): 26, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/Parameters/Issues/Winter_201415/Parameters
_Winter2014_15_v44n4.pdf. 
9Alex P Schmid, “Challenging the Narrative of the Islamic State,” (research paper), 
International Center for Counter-Terrorism-The Huge, 2015. 
10Charlie Winter, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda 




one expert, “the Islamic State has captured the imagination of the international 
media like no terrorist group before it.”11 This view holds that we must 
understand the Islamic State’s propaganda if we are to counter it effectively. In 
order to interpret the Islamic State’s comprehensive media strategy, it must be 
broken down into its fundamental parts. Experts suggest that if this can be 
accomplished, a more measured approach to the war of ideas can be realized.12   
One misconception discussed in the literature is that brutality is the main 
or singular theme of Islamic State propaganda. On the contrary, Charlie Winter 
argues that the Islamic State’s strategic messaging covers a full spectrum of 
ideas to include five additional themes: “besides brutality, it is preoccupied with 
mercy, victimhood, belonging, militarism, and of course, apocalyptic 
utopianism.”13 These themes must be analyzed to gain a better understanding of 
the Islamic State. A review of literature indicates that the Islamic State’s strategy 
is based on its propaganda that promotes finding one’s identity, belonging, 
purpose or spiritual fulfillment.14 This strategy allows the terrorist group to allure 
potential recruits, who for the lack of a positive more attractive counter or 
alternative narrative would choose to either join the Islamic State to escape a 
worst fate or simply change their current lifestyle.  
Scholars have declared, “there is no one-size-fits-all messaging strategy 
for any political movement, jihadist or otherwise.”15 With regard to understanding 
Islamic State propaganda, one must look beyond the violence and examine how 
                                            
11Winter, “The Virtual Caliphate,” 8. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid., 18. 
14Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State” The Soufan Group, accessed July 21, 2014. 
http://soufangroup.com/the-islamic-state/.  
15Winter, “Virtual Caliphate,” 13; and Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s 




their declaration of a caliphate has affected the Islamic State’s strategy.16 
Moreover, the Islamic State’s messaging strategy is centered on a wide array of 
audiences to include current and potential opponents, the international public, 
active members, disseminators and potential recruits.17 These messages are 
tailored to fit one or more of these groups, considering they are nebulous and 
commonly overlap. The State Department’s CSCC has focused its counter 
messaging strategy on potential recruits, which is only a portion of the audience 
listed above that the Islamic State targets.18   
2. The State Department’s Method 
CSCC director Alberto Fernandez described the mission of the State 
Department’s CSCC during a congressional hearing in 2012: 
CSCC was established at the direction of the President and the 
Secretary of State to coordinate, orient, and inform government-
wide foreign communications activities targeted against terrorism 
and violent extremism, particularly al-Qaeda and its allies… We 
work very closely with the bureau of Counterterrorism, other 
department bureaus and other agencies… So our goal is to move 
quickly, to respond effectively and contest the space, which had 
been for too long monopolized by our adversaries.19  
In addition to its mission, the CSCC had three guiding principles for its 
operation: “contest the space, redirect the conversation, and confound the 
adversary.” These principles make examining the audience, the adversary 
                                            
16 The Islamic State’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared his organization as ‘caliph’ on 
29 June 2014; Abu Muhammad al-Anani, “This is the promise of Allah,” al Furqan Foundation, 29 
June 2014. 
17al-Anani, “This is the Promise of Allah,” 28. 
18One of the missions of the CSCC as detailed in a statement provided by Alberto 
Fernandez, coordinator of the CSCC. U.S. Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation. “The State Department’s Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications: Mission, Operations, and Impact : Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee On Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee On Foreign Affairs,” 
House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, August 2, 2012 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012).  
19Fernandez, “State Department’s Center,” 6. 
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(Islamic State), and the appropriate themes extremely important in developing a 
counter-messaging strategy.20 
The State Department’s CSCC was comprised of three distinctive areas. 
The intelligence and analysis section of the center was responsible for gathering 
and analyzing information essential to the center’s mission to counter violent 
extremism.21 The plans and operations section was intended to design and 
implement communications strategies to counter violent extremist ability to recruit 
and win support.22 Lastly, the Digital Outreach Team was tasked with directly 
countering the narrative of violent extremists.23 Academics argue, however, that 
countering the narrative (a defensive mission) is only part of the solution.24 
Additionally, some suggest that it is necessary to develop alternative narratives, 
which would address issues of belonging and purpose. The State Department’s 
CSCC did not addressed these pursuits.25 
3. Challenging the Narrative of ISIL 
Outside of the State Department, many scholars and analysts have 
debated various methods of countering the Islamic State’s narrative. Some have 
gone as far as suggesting ways to not only counter the existing Islamic State 
narrative, but also construct a viable alternative narrative.26 Of these sources, 
most agree that the State Department is not efficient at countering the Islamic 
State. Due to the lack of efficient solicitation of assistance and support from the 
Muslim community, some critics suggest that the government in general may not 
be the best entity to carry out the mission of counter-messaging.  
                                            




24 Schmid, “Challenging the Narrative,” 15. 
25 Ibid., and Fernandez, “State Department’s Center,” 6. 
26 Schmid, “Challenging the Narrative,” 6–17. 
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In recent history, pundits suggest that U.S. actions internationally are one 
of the sources of America’s lack of credibility among Muslims worldwide, 
especially in the Middle East. Incidents at prison sites such as Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo Bay have created opportunities for jihadists to further their claims 
that the United States and apostate regimes are no different from each other.27 
Additionally, statements of top U.S. officials have added to the problem; for 
example, two scholars have argued that, “President Bush calling the war on 
terror a ‘Crusade,’ has played directly into the hands of the jihadi communication 
strategy.”28 This lack of credibility helps explain why some believe the State 
Department is not the right entity to disseminate strategic communications to 
counter the Islamic State. Messages designed to refute the Islamic State’s 
legitimacy—as many of the CSCC’s are—can not only become ineffective but 
also counterproductive and framed by jihadists as further attempts to manipulate 
Muslims.29 
Moreover, some experts have compared the “Truth” anti-smoking 
campaign with the strategic messaging campaign of the State Department.30 A 
review of literature indicates that the psychological dynamics involved with 
combating teenage smoking have striking similarities with the dynamics involved 
with countering the radicalization and recruitment of young adults by groups like 
ISIL.31 Experts suggest that the State Department’s “’Think Again, Turn Away’ 
campaign is eerily similar to the ineffective anti-smoking slogan of think, don’t 
smoke.”32 To this end, according to one expert, the CSCC should have adopted 
                                            
27 Steven R. Corman and Jill S. Schiefelbein. 2006. “Communication and media strategy in 
the Jihadi War of Ideas.” [Tempe]: Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State 
University, 17. 
http://www.asu.edu/clas/communication/about/terrorism/publications/jihad_comm_media.pdf.  
28 Corman and Schiefelbein, “Communication and media strategy,” 17. 
29 Ibid., 18. 
30 Pete Favat and Bryan C. Price, “The Truth Campaign and the War of Ideas,” Combating 
Terrorism Center Sentinel 8, No. 7 July 2015, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/post/july-2015-3.   




some of the productive tenets used in the Truth campaign to design a more 
efficient counter-messaging campaign in order to disrupt the Islamic State’s 
ability to recruit foreign fighters.33 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
It is difficult to establish a universally recognized and accepted model for a 
counter-narrative campaign and a useful measure of effectiveness to assess the 
State Department’s efforts to counter ISIL. Part of this difficulty stems from the 
lack of understanding of what motivates a person’s decision to join the Islamic 
State and become a foreign fighter. Additionally, establishing an appropriate 
measure of effectiveness is hindered by various factors that contribute to the 
Islamic State’s ability to recruit foreign fighters. 
In an attempt to limit the factors considered, this thesis does not concern 
itself with ISIL’s ability to raise funds, its military success on the ground, or its 
ability to seize and hold territory. Additionally, this thesis is not concerned with 
the other methods the United States and coalition partners have employed to 
counter ISIL outside of those of the State Department’s CSCC. This thesis 
attempts to establish an appropriate measure of effectiveness that can be 
applied to the State Department’s CSCC efforts to disrupt ISIL’s ability to recruit 
foreign fighters. Furthermore, using this measure of effectiveness, this thesis 
attempts to evaluate the efficacy of the CSCC’s efforts.  
My hypothesis is that the State Department’s efforts are not effectively 
disrupting ISIL’s ability to recruit foreign fighters, and consequently, a more 
robust campaign should be developed. Some scholars suggest making better 
use of the Muslim American population, while others suggest that the State 
department is not the right entity to take on this type of campaign. Still other 
authors suggest that the State Department review and adopt methods used in 
                                            
33 Favat and Price, “The Truth Campaign.” 
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the successful “Truth Anti-smoking Campaign.”34 Preliminary research indicates 
that the State Department’s Think Again, Turn Away campaign has not kept up 
with the massive the Islamic State media campaign. Additionally, the State 
Department’s efforts may be counter to its mission and actually strengthen the 
Islamic State’s campaign’s recruitment efforts.35  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This thesis sets out to accomplish three goals. The first goal is to assess 
the CSCC’s knowledge of the Islamic State’s propaganda strategy. The second 
goal is to assess the efficacy of the State Department’s CSCC efforts to disrupt 
the Islamic State’s ability to recruit foreign fighters. The third goal is to determine 
if there are cases of successful strategic communications methods available that 
might be used to improve the State Department’s efforts.  
This thesis attempts to assess the efficacy of the State Department’s 
CSCC by examining examples of successful strategic communications 
campaigns and that of unsuccessful ones. These examples will be helpful in the 
process of establishing a measure of effectiveness for counter-messaging 
strategies. In an attempt to measure effectiveness, this thesis reviews statistical 
data on ISIL’s recruiting efforts prior to and during the State Department’s Think 
Again, Turn Away campaign.  
Beyond those described in the literature review, sources include a broad 
array of academic books and articles, as well as multiple original source 
documents from the U.S. government. Original source documents include State 
Department and White House publications and articles from the Congressional 
                                            
34 Favat and Price, “Truth Campaign.” 
35 Ibid., and Alex P Schmid, “Challenging the Narrative of the Islamic State,” (Research 
Paper, International Center for Counter-Terrorism-The Huge, (2015). 
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Research Service.36 These sources offer insights into accepted definitions of key 
terms and provide political leaderships’ perspectives on the United States 
counter messaging campaign targeted at disrupting the recruitment activities of 
the Islamic State. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a 
brief history of the rise of the Islamic State, their use of propaganda, and their 
forms of recruitment. Chapter III provides an overview of the State Department’s 
CSCC establishment, reviews its efforts aimed at countering the Islamic State’s 
ability to recruit foreign fighters, and an examination of the effectiveness of these 
efforts. The conclusion ties the research together, draws overall conclusions, and 
explores other plausible recommended courses of action.  
                                            
36U.S. Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation. “The State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications: Mission, Operations, and Impact: Hearing Before the Subcommittee On 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee On Foreign Affairs,” House of 
Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, August 2, 2012 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. G.P.O., 2012).  
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II. THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
The group’s main tool has been brute force! As it attempts to build 
credibility and establish legitimacy, however, it has proved deft in 
the use of social media … to drive home its messages. 
—James P. Farwell, 
“The Media Strategy of ISIS,” Survival Magazine 
 
The terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS) currently operates 
primarily in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State is also known as the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and in 
Arabic as the acronym DAESH, but in this thesis, I will refer to the group as the 
Islamic State with the exception of direct quotations.37  
The Islamic State is undisputedly the largest and most influential terrorist 
group in the Middle East. The United States Central Intelligence Agency 
estimates that the Islamic State has more than 31,000 fighters.38 Researcher 
Daniel R. DePetris writes, “ISIL has single-handedly swept across an area of the 
Middle East roughly the size of Belgium.”39 This effort effectively revealed the 
weakness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and was seen as an embarrassment 
to the Iraqi government.40 Unlike al-Qaeda or other influential Islamist terrorist 
organizations, the Islamic State has set itself apart by its unique ability to capture 
and hold territory, and by its self-proclamation as an Islamic caliphate.41  
                                            
37The Levant as in ISIL referrers geographically to west part of Syria and Jordan, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Israel and parts of Egypt (Sinai).  
38Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State” The Soufan Group, (November 2014): 18, accessed  
July 21, 2015, http://soufangroup.com/the-islamic-state/.   
39Daniel R. DePetris, “The 5 Deadliest Terrorist Groups on the Planet,” The National 
Interest, (November 16, 2014) accessed 10 June 2016. 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/washington-watching-the-5-deadliest-terrorist-groups-the-11687. 
40DePetris, “The 5 Deadliest.”  
41Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (London: 
Verso, 2015), 4–6.  
12 
 
Moreover, the Islamic State has been able to recruit an unprecedented 
number of foreign fighters. Its lucrative recruiting efforts are possible due to its 
large footprint on the Internet. The Islamic State, its supporters, and its 
sympathizers use an array of social media outlets to disseminate propaganda via 
an elaborate strategic messaging campaign. Social media outlets allow the 
Islamic State to spread its powerful propaganda based on an extreme version of 
Sunni Islam, through this medium the Islamic State encourages the use of 
suicidal terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare tactics by millions of current 
and potential supporters.  
This chapter will examine the Islamic State, focusing on its ideology and 
other attributes. Furthermore, this chapter will analyze the geopolitical situation 
that allowed for the rise of the Islamic State, its use of strategic communications, 
and its propaganda.  
A. THE ISLAMIC STATE—BACKGROUND 
The Islamic State has emerged from multiple political, social, and 
economic tensions in the Middle East.42 Patrick Cockburn, a Middle East 
correspondent for the Independent, writes that  
ISIS is a child of war. Its members seek to reshape the world 
around them by acts of violence. The movement’s toxic but potent 
mix of extreme religious beliefs and military skill is the outcome of 
the war in Iraq since the U.S. invasion of 2003 and the war in Syria 
since 2011…It is the government and media consensus in the West 
that the civil war in Iraq was reignited by the sectarian policies of 
[the] Iraqi prime minister. In reality, it was the war in Syria that 
destabilized Iraq when jihadi groups like ISIS, then called al-Qaeda 
in Iraq, found a new battlefield where they could fight and flourish.43 
The Islamic State has challenged and continues to challenge the existing 
concepts of government, national identity, and state sovereignty.44 States were 
                                            
42 Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State”: 4.  
43Cockburn, “Rise of Islamic State,” 8. 
44 Barrett, “Islamic State,” 4. 
13 
 
created once the Ottoman Empire collapsed. These current geographic divisions 
now known as states became the source of people’s identity in the region. The 
Islamic State does not accept these divides and it has carved out its own territory 
without regard for the existing state lines.  
The infamous terrorist group had superseded al-Qaeda as the most 
dominant Jihadi group around the globe by June 2014.45 The Islamic State 
carried out an attack on Mosul with a force of approximately 1,300 troops against 
the Iraqi forces of approximately 60,000 men.46 Though their troops were 
tremendously outnumbered, the second-largest city in Iraq, Mosul, fell to the 
Islamic State on June 6, 2014, after only four days of open fighting. This rapid 
gain of territory across central and northern Iraq can be attributed to the lack of 
resistance from the U.S. trained ISF.  
The Islamic State has demonstrated that its clear understanding of the 
geopolitical situation and demographics in Iraq proved useful in its rise to power 
and gain of territory.47 At the time, Iraq and Syria was on the brink of civil war. 
The U.S. removed and installed a new government in Iraq. Subsequently, the 
United States pulled out of Iraq. In addition to other factors, these combined 
events helped to create a power vacuum in the region, which the Islamic State 
benefited from. 
The Islamic State gains its legitimacy from its seemingly extremist 
interpretation of Islam. Its ideological-religious appeal is modeled after the 
popular belief of Salafists. Salafists are a group that subscribes to a “strictly 
orthodox Sunni Muslim sect advocating a return to the early Islam of the 
Koran.”48 Additionally, they follow the belief of Sunna: “The Muslim world can and 
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should return to the simplicity and unity that they imagined existed in the earliest 
days of Islam.”49  
The Islamic State’s ideology is derived from Jihadi-Salafism, also referred 
to as jihadism.50 “Jihadi-Salafism is a distinctive ideological movement within 
Sunni Islam” that is based on an interpretation of Islamic scripture.51 A global 
network of websites, scholars and popular media outlets subscribe to this political 
school of thought as well.52 Jihadi-Salafism is “deeply rooted in pre-modern 
theological tradition and is extensively elaborated by a recognized cadre of 
religious authorities.”53 Both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda adheres to Jihadi-
Salafism, however, the Islamic State’s position is very narrow and strictly follows 
all the tents, which distinguishes the group from al-Qaeda.54  
Jihadi-Salafism was derived from two sources: the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement and Salafi. The movement was founded by Hasan al-Banna in1928.55 
This exclusively Sunni Muslim movement was founded on the basis of gaining 
power, influence, and capturing states, which at the time was in response to 
Western imperialism.56 Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood regarded the 
“caliphate as the ideal system of government for the Islamic world.”57 This was in 
unambiguous contrast to any other form of government, especially democracies.  
                                            
49 Oxford Dictionaries, “Salafi,” and Barrett, “Islamic State,” 9. 










The second source of Jihadi-Salafism, Salafi can be defined as a 
theological movement within Sunni Islam involving “purifying the faith.”58 Bunzel 
writes “Salafists regard themselves as the only true Muslims.”59 Moreover, the 
Salafi movement derived from Wahhabism, which is synonymous with the politics 
in Saudi Arabia.60  
Prominent U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia have contributed to the rise of 
the Islamic State. The implications of this connection are often understated. As 
previously mentioned, one of the main tenets of the Islamic State’s ideology is 
Jihadi-Salafism, which is derived directly from Wahhabism. Wahhabism is the 
basis of Saudi Arabia’s political system.61 Wahhabism, an “eighteenth-century 
version of Islam that imposes sharia law, regulates women of Islam to the status 
of second-class citizens, and regards Shia and Sufi Muslims as non-Muslims to 
be persecuted along with Christians and Jews.”62 Wahhabism has many shared 
themes with the Islamic State’s ideology. Wahhabism further exacerbates the 
volatile sectarian divide between the Sunni and Shia versions of Islam.63 This 
sectarian divide has been fueling civil war in Iraq and many other countries within 
the Middle East.  
This seemingly powerful religious based legitimacy allows the Islamic 
State to gain media support and recruit foreign fighters from all over the globe. 
Scholars agree that most of the Islamic State’s active supporters generally have 
insufficient religious knowledge to challenge the distortions of Islam prevalent 
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within the group’s ideology.64 Cockburn writes that the Islamic State within Iraq 
and the rest of the region exploits the same narrative of most global Jihadist 
terrorist groups: “the governments in the Muslim countries of the Middle East are 
corrupt, irreligious, and heavily influenced by the United States and other 
Western powers.”65  
The Islamic State has also distinguished itself from other similar terrorist 
groups by focusing on revolution in Muslim majority countries rather than on 
committing attacks against the Western countries that sponsor these 
governments, as al-Qaeda has in the past.66 Moreover, the leader of the Islamic 
State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared the terrorist group as the caliphate.67 This 
declaration and re-establishment of the caliphate has allowed the Islamic State to 
assert itself above all other Islamist groups.68 
B. GEOGRAPHICAL-POLITICAL SITUATION 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks consisted of four coordinated 
suicide attacks resulting in the successfully targeting of two symbolic U.S. 
landmarks: the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in 
Arlington, Virginia. In the aftermath of these attacks, the United States declared a 
war on terrorism. The war on terror has propelled the United States into a series 
of preemptive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to combat terrorist cells, find 
weapons of mass destruction, and prevent further terrorist attacks on the United 
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States. Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, was overthrown in 2003 as a result of 
the War on Terror.  
The occupation of Iraq included removing the Baathist government and 
installing a U.S.-backed democratic government. Additionally, the Iraqi Security 
Force (ISF), which includes both the Iraqi Army and police force, was 
disestablished, reestablished and trained by the United States. Seemingly, these 
changes were executed without a full understanding of the politics and 
demographics of Iraq. As a result, Iraq was left with a fragile, democratic Shia 
government. The ISF was well equipped but arguably poorly trained and 
motivated. Additionally, when the Iraqi army came under pressure from the 
Islamic State, it melted away without significant resistance.69 This fragility was 
exasperated the sectarian divide and led to a civil war between the Sunnis, the 
Shia and the Kurds, all fighting to protect their very existence.70  
The conditions above contributed to Iraq becoming a power vacuum and 
allowed the Islamic State to flourish. There are several accounts from people 
living under the Islamic State’s rule who felt the terrorist organization was a better 
alternative than the unstable central government. Cockburn quotes a story 
written by a Sunni woman living under the control of the Islamic State to 
underscore the point that the United States-backed government of Iraq is 
perceived as more threatening than the Islamic State: 
The bombardment was carried out by the government. The air 
strikes focused on wholly civilian neighborhoods. Maybe they 
wanted to target ISIS bases. But neither round of bombardment 
found its target. One target is a house connected to a church where 
ISIS men live. It is next to the neighborhood generator and about 
200–300 meters from our home. The bombing hurt civilians only 
and demolished the generator. Now we don’t have electricity since 
yesterday night. I am writing from a device in my sister’s house, 
which is empty. The government bombardment did not hit any of 
the ISIS men. I have just heard from a relative who visited us to 
                                            




check on us after the terrible night. He says that because of this 
bombardment, youngsters are joining ISIS in tens if not hundreds 
because this increase of hatred towards the government, which 
doesn’t care about us Sunnis being killed and targeted. 
Government forces went to Amerli, a Shia village surrounded by 
tens of Sunni villages, through Amerli was never taken by ISIS. The 
government militias attacked the surrounding Sunni villages, killing 
hundreds, with help from the American air strikes.71 
The weak government installed by the United States coupled with the 
ongoing sectarian civil war in Iraq allowed the Islamic State (at the time known as 
al-Qaeda in Iraq) to become stronger. Many leaders within the Baathist 
bureaucracy who were removed by the United States during the occupation 
subsequently joined the group, lending its military and political expertise.  
In addition to poor policies in Iraq, the ongoing civil unrest in Syria has 
contributed to the conditions that have allowed the Islamic State to gain traction. 
The United States and its allies have continually backed the anti-Assad groups in 
Syria. Western-backed anti-Assad militias continue the fighting even though at 
the time Syrian President Bashar Hafez al-Assad controlled an overwhelming 
majority of territory within Syria. Not only has the Islamic State routinely captured 
weapons from these militias, but the prolonged fighting has also deepened the 
gap between Sunni and Shia Muslims, creating ideal conditions for the Islamic 
State to gain the support of the Sunni opposition and the ability to recruit foreign 
fighters.72  
C. ISLAMIC STATE’S PROPAGANDA 
Scholars suggest the Islamic State’s unprecedented rise has contributed 
to a return of mainstream attentiveness to jihadist propaganda.73 Seemingly, a 
war of ideas is taking place. To this end, according to one expert, “the Islamic 
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State has captured the imagination of the international media like no terrorist 
group before it.”74  
With the press and social media saturated with Islamic State propaganda, 
creating a comparable messaging strategy should be paramount in addressing 
and countering the Islamic State’s messages. And to effectively counter the 
Islamic State’s propaganda, the first step must be to gain a thorough 
understanding of it.  
The Islamic State’s comprehensive media strategy has to be broken down 
into its integral parts. Experts suggest that if this can be accomplished, a more 
measured approach to the war of ideas can be realized.75 Additionally, Winter 
writes that “unless we understand the strategy behind the organization’s media 
machine, misconceptions about what drives its supporters-be they potential 
migrants or potential domestic terrorist—will continue to flourish.”76  
As mentioned in Chapter I, the Islamic State’s strategic messaging covers 
a full spectrum of ideas to include six main themes—brutality, mercy, victimhood, 
belonging, militarism, and apocalyptic utopianism.77 Acknowledging and 
understanding the role of these six themes are the keys to developing a 
comprehensive media strategy for effectively countering the Islamic State. A 
review of literature indicates that the Islamic State’s strategy allures potential 
recruits—in the absence of a positive more attractive counter or alternative 
narrative—with its propaganda that promotes finding one’s identity, belonging, 
purpose or spiritual fulfillment.78 The Islamic State’s effective propaganda 
strategy combined with its powerful use of ideology has enabled the Islamic State 
to recruit an unprecedented number of foreign fighters. 
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D. SUMMARY OF ISLAMIC STATE’S ATTRIBUTES 
The Islamic State has become the dominant terrorist group operating 
primarily in Iraq and Syria. It started in Iraq as a faction of al-Qaeda. Once the 
U.S.-led coalition forces overthrew the government in Iraq, a complicated 
sectarian divide produced civil war, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare, all in the 
name of political reform. The Islamic State’s ideology coupled with its declaration 
as the caliphate allows it to claim that it is the only true and pure form of 
government, and that all others, especially democracies, should not and will not 
be tolerated. Its record indicates that it believes that secular- or non-Muslim- 
governed states have no power. On that basis, the Islamic State has created a 
de facto state through propaganda, violence and fear. The Islamic State has 
been able to take advantage of its knowledge of demographics and politics within 
Iraq and Syria. The terrorist group has also been able to make use of its powerful 
propaganda via traditional and social media outlets to recruit foreign fighters.  
Scholars agree that the rise of the Islamic State has been exacerbated by 
the sectarian divide and civil war in Iraq and Syria, in addition to the fear and 
discontent for the Western backed governments of these states. The Islamic 
State has been able to capitalize on the Sunni’s fear of the U.S. backed Iraqi 
government and the ongoing civil war in Syria. Though the Islamic State may not 
be popular, it uses fear to control the people living under its rule and it is 
considered the lesser of two evils. As the Islamic State continues to rise, we do 
not know how long the group will be able to impact politics in the Middle East. By 
understanding the Islamic State’s ideology, there is a better chance that the 
United States and its State Department can curtail this rise by using its own 




III. THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC COUNTERTERRORISM 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Run do not walk to ISIS Land. Come over for as Syria is no longer 
for Syrians, and Iraq is no longer for Iraqis. Where you can learn 
useful new skills for the Ummah! Blowing up mosques! Crucifying 
and executing Muslims! Plundering public resources! Suicide 
bombings inside mosques! Travel is inexpensive because you 
won’t need a return ticket!   
—State Department video,  
“Welcome to the Islamic State Land,” YouTube 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The excerpt above is the caption from the video, “Welcome to the Islamic 
State Land,” released by the State Department’s Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) on July 23, 2014.79 The video depicts 
graphic images and short clips of the Islamic State in action. It portrays the way 
the group treats people on the ground and urges Muslims not to join the Islamic 
State. The video is one of the strategic releases by the State Department’s Think 
Again Turn Away media campaign to frame the Islamic State as inconsistent in 
its ideology and as a dangerous place for Muslims who follow the terrorist group. 
This notable propaganda counter-offensive effort by the CSCC used raw material 
gathered from the Islamic State’s own images of barbaric acts. This video has 
been highly criticized, as have other communications efforts of the CSCC.  
This thesis aims to evaluate the efficacy of the State Department’s 
CSCC’s efforts to disrupt the Islamic States’ ability to recruit foreign fighters. As 
noted in Chapter I, the Global Engagement Center has recently replaced the 
CSCC. An understanding of the strengths and weakness of the CSCC will be 
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essential to the success of the Global Engagement Center, and this chapter is 
intended to provide such an understanding. This chapter explores the different 
departments that made up the CSCC and their roles in countering Islamic State 
propaganda and the recruitment of foreign fighters. The Center’s mission and its 
purpose are examined. Moreover, the CSCC’s Think Again Turn Away campaign 
will be analyzed along with its social media operations, both in print and video 
formats such as the video described above.  
B. THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S CSCC 
The U.S. government created the CSCC as one of various tools the State 
Department could use to contend better with terrorist groups in the war of ideas. 
Specifically, its mission was “to identify, confront, and undermine the 
communications of al-Qaeda affiliates.”80 To achieve its goals, the CSCC was 
divided into three entities: intelligence and analysis, plans and operations, and a 
Digital Outreach team (DOT).81  
Within its intelligence and analysis section, the CSCC was responsible for 
coordinating its efforts with various U.S. intelligence agencies.82 The intelligence 
and analysis section followed two guiding principles. First, it must ensure all of its 
efforts were interagency coordinated.83 Prior to the launching of the CSCC, little 
interdepartmental coordination existed. Within the U.S. government, multiple 
agencies had overlapping responsibilities within the counterterrorism/counter-
violent extremist realm, yet their efforts were uncoordinated. Second, the 
intelligence and analysis section was to make the best use of information 
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provided by intelligence agencies and academic analysis of the adversary of 
interest.84  
The plans and operations team designed and implemented all non-digital 
counter violent extremist communication tools.85 These tools were used to 
counter terrorist groups’ ability to gain support and recruit new members. The 
materials produced by this section could be used by all U.S. government 
agencies.86 
The third section of the CSCC was its Digital Outreach Team. This team 
was responsible for authoring, coordinating, disseminating, and branding all of 
the center’s digital communications, including written and video communications, 
and especially those posted to social media websites.87 The activities of the DOT 
were guided by three principles: “Contest the space, redirect the conversation, 
and confound the adversary.”88 In an effort to refine the material to be analyzed, 
this thesis focuses on the digital efforts of the CSCC, its use of social media to 
counter the Islamic State’s propaganda, and the terrorist group’s ability to recruit 
foreign fighters. Hence, the Digital Outreach Team will be central to the analysis 
of the efficacy of the State Department’s efforts to counter the Islamic State. 
The CSCC had the stated intention of contesting the space (social media 
presence) and being innovative; but was it able to keep pace with the robust 
communications campaign of the Islamic State? Moreover, is the State 
Department, as one of the larger U.S. government bureaucracies, the right entity 
to effectively counter the Islamic State’s messages? Many scholars suggest that 
not only was the Center’s Digital Outreach Team unable to keep pace with the 
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Islamic State, but it may have actually been counterproductive.89 Some pundits 
go as far as to argue that the State Department is not effective at all, considering 
it is a government agency attempting to target a young, impressionable, pre-
radicalized audience. Nicholas Rasmussen, the director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center, declared in a statement to the Senate Intelligence 
Committee in 2015 that “unfortunately, as we all know, the government is 
probably not the best platform to try to communicate with the set of actors who 
are probably vulnerable to this kind of propaganda and this type of recruiting.”90  
C. THINK AGAIN TURN AWAY  
Another one of the CSCC’s stated missions was to disrupt the terrorist 
group’s ability to recruit foreign fighters.91 The State Department’s CSCC 
launched its Think Again, Turn Away campaign in late 2013, specifically to 
counter the propaganda of the Islamic State.92 The campaign was an additional 
tool used by the center’s Digital Outreach Team to compete with the Islamic 
State to “enter the war of ideas and win over the hearts and minds of jihadists 
using social media” as its platform in multiple languages.93 
Think Again, Turn Away appeared in Arabic, Urdu, Punjabi, Somali, and 
English to “counter terrorist propaganda and misinformation about the United 
States.”94 The campaign used its accounts on Twitter in two distinctive ways: to 
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disseminate counter-messaging materials and to directly address popular jihadist 
accounts.95 Its stated aim was to expose facts about terrorist groups such as the 
Islamic State and point out fallacies within terrorist propaganda. As part of its 
messaging strategy to highlight differences in terrorist propaganda and realities 
on the ground, the CSCC used brief clips from existing terrorist propaganda.  
D. THE GOOD AND THE BAD: A CRITIQUE OF THE CSCC  
Strategic communications is one of the critical areas in which the United 
States, and more specifically the State Department’s CSCC, strives to counter 
the Islamic State. However, the Islamic State uses a wide array of social media 
outlets to communicate, including both public and private sites and applications, 
such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, the WhatsApp and Snapchat.96 In addition, 
most of Islamic State’s communication efforts are decentralized, which makes 
targeting them directly extremely difficult. Even so, the State Department’s CSCC 
has been subject to various accusations of inefficiency and complaints.  
The State Department uses multiple strategies, both overt and covert. The 
CSCC had attempted to counter the Islamic State using public platforms, and it 
saw some success in terms of attracting followers. For example, its Arabic 
language Facebook Page had approximately 146,445 followers.97 It has also 
used general posts such as the re-posting of material from Arabic news outlets to 
influence its targeted Middle Eastern audience and appear less pro-Western. 
However, an assessment of a counter-messaging strategy cannot be evaluated 
solely on likes, views, and followers.  
1. Social Media Tactics 
The value of U.S. social media presence remains debatable. While in 
operation, the CSCC’s Digital Outreach Team used its Arabic Twitter account to 
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portray the Islamic State’s seeming lack of humanity. However, the type of 
comparisons the CSCC made was quite ambiguous. For example, the CSCC 
wrote in Arabic, “What is the difference between members of DAESH and 
hyenas?”98 Within the same post, they attached a graphic video depicting a pack 
of hyenas killing its prey, followed by members of ISIL conducting a beheading.99 
These images may be disturbing to some, showing that the Islamic State’s 
actions are similar to the actions of animals; however, to a troubled, mostly 
young male audience, they may very well appear to boast about ISIL’s ability to 
take down its adversary and show no mercy—a function of The Islamic State’s 
own propaganda. Unfortunately, this example of misleading or communicating a 
mixed message mirrors multiple examples of messages that made the CSCC 
notorious.100 
2. Messaging Complaints 
The CSCC has used its Twitter accounts in English, Arabic, and other 
languages to engage directly with jihadists, specifically employing tactics that 
promote the Islamic State’s narrative. Moreover, the CSCC’s English-language 
Twitter account has been highly criticized for engaging in meaningless 
communications directly with jihadist accounts. One critic accused the State 
Department of being counterproductive by wasting the government’s time and 
money by engaging in trivial conversations on its website. In her article “The 
State Department’s Twitter War with ISIS is Embarrassing,” Rita Katz declares 
that the State department regularly engaged in menial conversations with jihadist 
and implied that the Department’s actions were embarrassing.101 Katz’s 
criticisms are warranted due to the number of times the State Department 
                                            
98 Ibid., 5. 
99Bouzis, “Countering the Islamic State,” 4. 
100 Barbara Plett Usher, “The U.S. state department’s YouTube ‘digital jihad,” BBC News 
Magazine, November 28, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30045038.  
101Katz, “State Department’s Twitter War, 4.”  
27 
 
responded to other accounts in a child-like argumentative manner. The United 
States is a state actor, so meeting the terrorist group on their level gives reason 
for pause. Many of the Department’s tweets have validated Islamic State leaders 
by addressing and, in some cases, providing a direct response to their accounts. 
Since these conversations used a U.S. government asset, the CSCC’s Twitter 
account had unintentionally become yet another platform for terrorist groups to 
voice their arguments, and inadvertently recruit more followers and foreign 
fighters. This is in stark contrast to the State’ Department Center’s mission and 
has negatively impacted its efficiency in its counter-messaging efforts. 
In response to the growing number of complaints regarding the CSCC’s 
tactics and lack of efficiency, the center’s director and other officials openly 
expressed their own frustration. CSCC’s director Fernandez, for example, 
suggested that the center lacked the ability to fully counter the sheer volume of 
the Islamic States propaganda.102 However, they have not offered any real 
explanations as to why the center had not been able to curtail the Islamic States’ 
social media operations.  
Another challenge the State Department’s CSCC faced with its digital 
counter-messaging strategy was the rate at which information is disseminated 
online. For example, when the U.S. Department of Defense decided to use the 
Apache Helicopter in Iraq, within hours Islamic State followers and sympathizers 
gathered specific data about the helicopter, to include its weapons suite and how 
to best shoot it down, and published the information online. Terrorist groups 
immediately took action and used this information to further their propaganda.103  
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Richard A. Stengel, the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and 
public affairs, told the New York Times that “we are getting beaten on volume, so 
the only way to compete is by aggregating creating and amplifying existing 
content.”104 Jen Psaki, a spokeswoman for the State Department, responded to 
CNN in regard to the volume of Islamic State’s social media posts: “We are 
seeing 90,000 tweets a day that we are combating!”105 The Islamic State has 
demonstrated a surprising amount of skillfulness and preeminence with 
disseminating its propaganda via social media outlets.106 Psaki also told CNN: 
“There is no question what we’re combating with ISIL’s propaganda machine is 
something we have not seen before.”107 During a Senate hearing, the director of 
the CSCC, Fernandez, stated that “radical Islamist clerics and terrorist 
organizations have become masters at using social media.”108 He declared that 
social media websites such as Twitter and Facebook allow those who have been 
radicalized to package and distribute its messages to every growing audience 
instantaneously.109  
3. Resources 
Not only have the State Department CSCC’s strategic messaging tactics 
been criticized, but its budget had also been under constant scrutiny. The State 
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Department’s operating budget in 2015 was $40.3 billion, while the Department 
of Defense’s budget was $495.6 billion for the same year.110 How and where a 
country places its resources says a lot about its priorities and lends a view into its 
overall strategy, and such a grave imbalance with regard to the two departments 
may be part of the reason why the CSCC failed. 
Moreover, other critics of Think Again Turn away and previous members 
of the CSCC have declared that “the U.S. government has failed to provide the 
time, attention, and resources necessary to match the size and scope of the 
Islamic State’s propaganda machine.”111 In 2015, Fernandez and other members 
and supporters of the CSCC complained that “neither the State Department nor 
the White House fully supported or properly financed the center’s activities.”112 At 
the time of the ambassador’s comments, the CSCC operated with a staff of less 
than one hundred, and on a budget of only approximately $5 million a year.113 
4. Narratives  
Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was quoted in The Atlantic 
exclaiming that, “the war on narratives has become even more important than the 
war of navies, napalm, and knives.”114 As detailed in Chapter II, the Islamic 
State’s narrative portrays itself clearly to its supporters, prospective followers, 
and recruits. But what is the CSCC’s narrative? One of the most prominent of all 
reasons that the State Department’s CSCC has not had notable success is that it 
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lacks a narrative. During an interview, CSCC director Fernandez exclaimed that 
“we don’t have a counter-narrative…what we (The CSCC) have is half a 
message.” His comments referred to the fact that the Islamic State presents a 
problem and solution to that problem; whereas, in addition to the CSCC’s lack of 
a narrative, it only recommended not following the Islamic State. The CSCC, in 
turn, provided only a negative message but did not offer a positive narrative of 
what it wants one to do.115 As with many forms of communication, providing a 
positive message or an alternative narrative is more effective than the lack of one 
or using a negative one.  
5. Foreign Fighters  
In 2015, the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and 
Political Violence declared that the Islamic State had at least 20,000 foreign 
fighters. This number had increased by approximately 5,000 since the previous 
year. Apparently, the Islamic State’s inexhaustible online presence, combined 
with its 2014 self-declaration as the caliphate and battlefield success, has 
contributed to its recruitment efforts. That the United States and many of its allies 
have also contributed to its recruitment success cannot be understated. 
Detrimental statements from Washington drive home this point. The White House 
states that the Islamic State was “an imminent threat to every interest we have,” 
and a member of the U.S. Congress said, “These people have become very 
sophisticated.116 Additionally, Senator James Inhofe describes how we boast that 
the Islamic State is an exceptional group: 
We’re in the most dangerous position we’ve ever been in as a 
nation…ISIS, they are really bad terrorists, they’re so bad even Al 
Qaeda is afraid of them… They’re crazy out there and they are 
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rapidly developing a method of blowing up a major U.S. city and 
people just can’t believe that’s happening.117  
The comments by Senator Inhofe, made as a member of the Armed 
Forces Committee, directly validate the Islamic State as a powerful group. This is 
an example of the type of affirmation that has aided the Islamic State with its 
recruitment methods and has made it harder for the CSCC to diminish the 
group’s recruitment efforts. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the State Department’s recently realigned Center 
for Strategic Counter Terrorism Communications—its mission, its principles, its 
organizational structure, and its use of social media via its Think again, Turn 
Away campaign to counter Islamic State propaganda. It demonstrated that the 
CSCC had entered the War of Ideas against the Islamic State; however, its 
digital footprint may have not been large enough to effectively counter the 
terrorist group. Though the CSCC had marginal success, many of its operations 
were met with stark criticism.  
Counter-messaging is not an exact science; hence, the Center’s efficiency 
is hard to measure. But a review of various critiques yielded the results listed 
below. The counter-messaging strategy of the Center produced ambiguous, if not 
misleading, messages at best. The sheer volume of content the Islamic State 
puts on social media on a daily bases is difficult to contend with, but the Center’s 
small staff and budget did not allow them to effectively counter the narrative of 
the Islamic State. Even if the CSCC did have a larger staff and budget, it would 
be hard for any government bureaucracy to keep up with the amount of 
information that is constantly being disseminated by the decentralized Islamic 
State. Moreover, the counter-messaging strategy of the CSCC lacked a 
narrative, and in particular it did not offer a clear, positive narrative that could 
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give potential ISIL sympathizers any alternative. Lastly, the United States, 
including government entities and the media, may be doing itself a disservice by 
recognizing and sensationalizing the terrorist group as exceptional. Such 
descriptions and characterizations of the Islamic State as exceptional were 
contrary to the State Department CSCC’s messaging campaign and directly 
supported the group’s propaganda.  
The final chapter of this thesis provides an overview of the Global 
Engagement Center, which replaced the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications, and compares the two organizations. It also offers solutions to 
the problem of countering the Islamic State’s narrative. Finally, it suggests 
alternative narratives that that could be employed by the Global Engagement 
Center, and considers ways that Muslim community leaders could be recruited to 






This thesis analyzed the Center for Strategic Counter-terrorism 
Communications, including its mission, strategy, and communication methods to 
assess the efficacy of its efforts to counter the Islamic State and weaken the 
group’s ability to recruit foreign fighters. It outlined the Islamic State’s mission 
and forms of propaganda used via social media outlets. Within that context, it 
analyzed the plausible reasons for the successful recruitment of ISIL and the 
CSCC’s methods to counter them. The research illustrated that there were clear 
explanations for that success based on both the kinetic and non-kinetic success 
of the Islamic State, the empowerment of the group in the media and the reality 
on the ground. This chapter concludes with a review of the research findings, 
additional notes on the Global Engagement Center (GEC), and 
recommendations for future consideration. 
A. REVIEW 
This thesis reviewed factors such as the Islamic State’s propaganda 
efforts and its success in recruiting a continuous flow of foreign fighters. In 
addition, a thorough inquiry was made into the Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications and its efforts to curtail these efforts of the 
Islamic State. A diverse range of academic and subject matter expert critiques of 
the CSCC’s efforts were also taken into consideration. 
The analysis of this thesis suggests that the CSCC did not carry out its 
stated mission effectively. The ultimate realignment of the CSCC and recent 
establishment of the Global Engagement Center show that the U.S. government 
also felt that the CSCC’s level of efficiency fell short. In his remarks regarding the 
CSCC, the first director of the GEC stated that, “over time, we were not putting 
the right amount of resources—technology, people, and funding—necessary to 
address the evolving threat. The communications landscape has changed, and 
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we must adapt to it to be successful.”118 His remarks suggest that the CSCC just 
could not keep pace with the Islamic State’s communications efforts.  
The CSCC did not provide a narrative for potential Islamic State recruits to 
follow; it only provided a half or negative message. The United States and others 
continually validate the lethality and appeal of the Islamic State by the way they 
are portrayed by senior government officials and in the media as an exceptional 
group. Finally, by virtue of branding its communications, the CSCC did itself a 
disservice to the multitudes of groups who do not recognize the United States a 
creditable source of information, including its main target audience.  
B. THE GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER 
Our messaging cannot be just an after-thought, but rather it has to 
be baked into everything we do from the beginning. As a 
government fighting an agile movement, we face disadvantages… 
We have to break out of our traditional bureaucratic stovepipes and 
be innovative and agile to address this threat.  
–Michael D. Lumpkin on the Global Engagement Center 
“Engaging Through Messaging” 
Spring 2016 Ambassador’s Review  
 
On March 14, 2016, Executive Order 13721 established the Global 
Engagement Center, which effectively replaced the Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communication.119 Michael D. Lumpkin was named special 
envoy and coordinator of the new center; he served in that position until the end 
of the Obama administration.120 The GEC is housed within the State Department, 
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but it is considered an interagency organization.121 Its main charge is to 
coordinate strategic counterterrorism messages to foreign audiences on the 
United States behalf to “diminish the influence of international terrorist 
organizations, such as ISIL.”122  
The Global Engagement Center has bolder and notably different goals 
and themes than the late CSCC. The GEC is centered on fostering 
partnerships.123 It seeks to orchestrate and enable a global network of credible 
voices, not only government actors but also non-government actors and beyond, 
to confront and discredit ISIL’s repulsive messages.124 It explicitly states that “the 
new strategy seeks to be more effective in the information space,” implying that 
there was more to be desired in regards to the effectiveness of its predecessor 
the CSCC. But the Global Engagement Center’s main goal is very similar to that 
of the CSCC: “expose ISIL’s true nature…thereby diminishing their influence and 
decreasing this organization’s allure in the eyes of potential recruits and 
sympathizers.”125  
The Global Engagement Center is organized into four core competency 
areas: partnerships, data analytics, content, and interagency engagement. In the 
first area of partnerships, the GEC has launched initiatives which include 
fostering partnerships and empowering groups on a local level such as schools 
and universities, civil and religious leaders, and directly with youth groups to 
name a few. As research shows us, this may be a huge, once missing piece of 
the strategic communications puzzle.126 In the past, critics pointed to this very 
thing as a solution to the CSCC’s methods with regard to the credibility of only 
relying on the government to create and disseminate counterterrorism 
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messaging. These types of decentralized partnerships may prove to be more 
effective than the messaging campaigns used in the past.  
The next area of discussion is the GEC’s focus on data analytics. The 
center values and is striving to use data analytics to better understand how 
people become radicalized over the internet, and use this data to not only guide 
the center’s own messaging efforts but also to create a plausible measure of 
effectiveness.127 This data includes proven measures of effectiveness such as 
polling, studies of the targeted audience, and academic research of all levels. By 
placing a precedent on the means for the Global Engagement Center to evaluate 
and critique itself, it should be able to grow and become increasingly effective in 
reaching its mission. 
The last two focus areas of the GEC are content and interagency 
engagement. The importance of these areas of focus cannot be denied. As noted 
above, scholars found that the CSCC’s messages were ambiguous and at times 
misleading. This focus not only addresses this issue but also strives to reduce its 
own direct messages to ensure messaging is coordinated and less vague. And in 
the area of interagency engagement, members of various U.S. security 
departments staff the GEC to ensure interagency coordination and the 
synchronizing of the entire government’s efforts to dismantle the Islamic State.  
In general the language used by the U.S. State Department in describing 
the GEC directly addresses many of the underlying issues that the CSCC’s 
effectiveness suffered from. It acknowledges the need and importance of 
enabling creditable voices. This acknowledgment seems to be a response to the 
many critics that the government, or the government alone, was not a creditable 
voice in the minds of potential Islamic State sympathizers and potential recruits. 
The Center also strives to “enhance the capacities and empower third party, 
positive messengers,” yet another example of the GEC’s effort to address issues 
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that haunted the CSCC. Within this research, it was uncovered that the CSCC 
only provided a negative message—don not do this–-instead of a complete, or a 
positive one. Hopefully, this acknowledgment on the part of the GEC will lead to 
the United States’ ability to find and portray a positive more complete message in 
its efforts to counter the Islamic State.  
C. RECOMMENDATION: A COUNTER-NARRATIVE 
As discussed in Chapter III, the State Department’s CSCC was unable to 
challenge the volume of the Islamic State’s propaganda. Most of the center’s 
efforts lacked the relevant research, resources, or skills—resulting in an 
“investment without return.”128 To effectively counter ISIL’s influential 
propaganda, the United States must first fully understand them. The Islamic 
State’s narratives continue to attract foreign and local populations. According to 
one narrative analytics company, young Sunni’s, specifically those who have 
never lived under a functional state, are highly influenced by ISIL’s narratives.129 
For example, a 17-year-old male Syrian has known war for most of his life. It is 
unlikely that he recalls any purposeful state services such as trash disposal or 
the military. Consequently, the Islamic State promises such as law and order 
may be a welcome change to this young man and many others of similar 
circumstance.130 
The Islamic State’s narratives resonate with Muslims seeking a state 
govern by Islamic laws. ISIL’s declaration of the caliphate has proven to be quite 
powerful. According to the Monitor 360, “This narrative leverages feelings of 
economic disenfranchisement and social exclusion of Muslim communities in the 
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West to promote the Caliphate as a place where they have a purpose and are 
part of a broader transnational movement.”131 
Having a counter-narrative, not just a counter message or a negative 
message, is key to competing with the Islamic State and winning the war of 
ideas. The authors of the Monitor 360 article eloquently stated that “the success 
of the U.S. strategy to reverse ISIL’s territorial gains and popular appeal in the 
Middle East will depend in large part on the development of an effective counter-
narrative strategy to combat a wider ISIL threat.”132 The Global Engagement 
Center is making strides to compete better with ISIL through its new vision and 
mission to become less branded and more partnership oriented. The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy recommends that a successful counter-messaging 
campaign highlight the fighting between different Sunni Jihadi groups and the 
Islamic State’s abuse and mistreatment of innocent groups of people.133 
Additionally, the conditions on the ground must deny the Islamic State battlefield 
success. However, the milestone of creating a narrative has not yet been fully 
realized.  
This thesis recommends an additional approach. In addition to the strides 
being made by the Global Engagement Center, the U.S. counter-narrative should 
consist of these two elements. First, it needs to portray the Islamic State as a 
criminal, manipulative, and a failing organization. Far too often, the group is 
portrayed as exceptional, but dangerous and powerful. These traits attract 
recruits. The U.S. should not refer to the Islamic State as a state or recognize its 
leaders. The entire U.S. government and a concerted effort by media outlets 
need to deliver the same message.  
Finally, counter-narratives must directly target specific vulnerable 
audiences. Again, the Global Engagement Center is working on various data 
                                            





analytics techniques. This data must be analyzed and used to identify specific 
targets and the most efficient way to reach potential Islamic State supporters and 
recruits. The U.S. counter-narrative must be inclusive, give hope and be positive, 
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